In this correspondence, we give some restrictions on weight enumerators of singly even self-dual [ 2 ] codes whose shadows have minimum weight 2. As a consequence, we determine the weight enumerators for which there is an extremal singly even self-dual [40 20 8] code and an optimal singly even self-dual [50 25 10] code.
Note, however, that the algorithm 7 m r (l) gives almost no advantage for the subcodes considered in the previous subsection. Indeed, these subcodes are obtained by eliminating the leftmost (least protected) information bits. However, any new permutation (i) assigns the new information bits to these leftmost nodes. Thus, the new bits also become the least protected. Another unsatisfactory observation is that increasing the size of the permutation set T -say, to include all m! permutations of all m indices-helps little in improving decoding performance. More generally, there are a number of important open problems related to these permutation techniques. We name a few: -find the best permutation set T for the algorithm 7 m r (l); -analyze the algorithm 7 m r (l) analytically; -modify the algorithm 7 m r (l) for subcodes.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this correspondence, we considered recursive decoding algorithms for RM codes that can provide near-ML decoding with feasible complexity for RM codes or their subcodes on the moderate lengths n 512.
Our study still leaves many open problems. First, we need to tightly estimate the error probabilities p() on the different paths . To optimize our pruning procedures for specific subcodes, it is important to find the order in which information bits should be removed from the original RM code. Finally, it is still an open problem to analytically estimate the performance of the algorithms 9 m r (L) and 7 m r (l).
I. INTRODUCTION
Let C be a singly even self-dual code and let C 0 denote the subcode of codewords having weight 0 (mod 4). Then C0 is a subcode of codimension 1. The shadow S of C is defined to be C ?
Shadows for self-dual codes were introduced by Conway and Sloane [1] in order to derive new upper bounds for the minimum weight of singly even self-dual codes, and to provide restrictions on the weight enumerators of singly even self-dual codes. Using shadows, the largest possible minimum weights of singly even self-dual codes of lengths up to 72 are determined in [1, Table I ]. The work was extended to lengths up to 100 in [2, Table VI given in [1] for lengths up to 64 and length 72 (see also [3] for length 60), and the work was extended to lengths up to 100 in [2] (see also [4] for length 68).
It was shown in [5] that the minimum weight d of a singly even self-dual code of length n is bounded by d 4[n=24] + 4 unless n 22 (mod 24) when d 4[n=24] + 6. We call a singly even self-dual code meeting this upper bound extremal. It is known that no extremal singly even self-dual code exists for some lengths. According to [6] , a singly even self-dual code is called optimal if it has the largest minimum weight among all singly even self-dual codes of that length. In this correspondence, we give some restriction on the number of vectors of weight d=2 in the shadow of a singly even self-dual [n; n=2; d] code. We eliminate some of the possible weight enumerators determined in [1] and [2] for singly even self-dual codes with the largest possible minimum weight. In particular, we determine the weight enumerators for which there is an extremal singly even self-dual [40; 20; 8] code and an optimal singly even self-dual [50; 25; 10] code.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this section, let C be a singly even self-dual code of length n and let C 0 denote the subcode of codewords having weight 0 (mod 4). There are cosets C1; C2; C3 of C0 such that C ?
shadow. Let B i be the number of vectors of weight i in the shadow S. Lemma 1 (Brualdi and Pless [7] ): Let x; x 0 be vectors of C 1 and let y; y 0 be vectors of C3. Then we have the following: 1) if n 0 (mod 4) then x; y are not orthogonal; 2) if n 2 (mod 4) then x; x 0 are not orthogonal and y; y 0 are not orthogonal.
Although the following sharpenings of [1, Theorem 6c), (19)] follow easily from Lemma 1, the consequences implied by them (cf. Sections III and IV) do not seem to be made explicit in the literature.
Lemma 2:
Suppose that n 2 (mod 4). Then B d=2 2. If B d=2 = 2, then each of C1 and C3 contains exactly one of the two vectors of weight d=2 in S.
Proof: Assume that S contains at least 3 vectors of weight d=2. Then we may suppose without loss of generality that C1 contains at least two vectors of weight d=2. By Lemma 1, any two vectors in C 1 (or C 3 ) are not orthogonal. The sum of any two vectors in the shadow is a codeword of C. Hence, C contains a codeword of weight less than d which gives a contradiction.
Lemma 3: Suppose that n 0 (mod 4). Then B d=2 2n=d, and one of C 1 or C 3 contains all the vectors of weight d=2 in the shadow. Moreover, we have the following:
Proof: Let x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x B be the vectors of weight d=2 in S. Since the sum of two vectors of S is a codeword of C, these vectors have disjoint supports. This implies (d=2)B d=2 n, and that these vectors are pairwise orthogonal. In particular, one of C 1 or C 3 must contain all of them by Lemma 1.
i) Suppose contrary, that B d=2 = 2n=d 0 1. Let y be the sum of the all-one vector and x 1 +x 2 +. . .+x B , so that y has weight d=2. Then y is a codeword if B d=2 is even, while y belongs to the shadow and is different from
Thus we obtain a contradiction in both cases.
ii) Suppose contrary, that B d=2 2[n=d]. Let y be the sum of the all-one vector and x 1 + x 2 + . . . + x 2[(n=d)] . Then y is a nonzero codeword of weight less than d. This is a contradiction.
Although the above lemmas can be applied to any singly even selfdual code, we concentrate on extremal singly even self-dual codes and optimal singly even self-dual codes in the next sections. 1) where is an integer. By Lemma 3, 0 10 and 6 = 9. For the weight enumerators WC ( = 0; 1; . . . ; 8 and 10), it is known that there is a singly even self-dual [40; 20; 8] code (see [6] ). Hence, we have the following. Let C be a singly even self-dual [40; 20; 8] code whose shadow C 1 [ C 3 has minimum weight 4. By Lemma 3, we may assume that C 3 contains the vectors of weight 4 in the shadow. For 6 = 0, the decomposition of the weight enumerator of the shadow S into the weight enumerators of C 1 and C 3 is uniquely determined. In fact, by Theorem We remark that this decomposition holds also for = 0 (see [8] ). Now we give some restriction on the possible weight enumerators of extremal singly even self-dual codes of lengths 60, 68, 80, and 88.
• where is an integer [3] . By Lemma 3, 0 10; 6 = 9.
Singly even self-dual [60; 30; 10] codes with weight enumerators W C are known for = 0; 1; 7; 10 (see [6] ). where ; are integers. We remark that the weight enumerators of C and S given in [2] are incorrect and the correct possible weight enumerators for C are given in [4] . Here we give the possible weight enumerators of C along with those of S. By Lemma 3, 0 9. For = 0; 1; 2 only, singly even self-dual [68; 34; 12] codes with weight enumerators WC are known for many values of (see [6] ).
• where is an integer [2] . By Lemma 3, 0 10; 6 = 9. It is not known whether there is a singly even self-dual [80; 40; 16] code. 
where is an integer [1] . By Lemma 2, 0 2. For the weight enumerators W C ( = 0; 1; 2), it is known that there are singly even self-dual [50; 25; 10] codes (see [6] ). The other possible weight enumerator for singly even self-dual [50; 25; 10] codes is 1 + 196y 10 + 11368y 12 + . . .
and there are codes with the weight enumerator [9] , [10] , [11] . Hence, we have the following. under the assumption that C 1 contains the vector of weight 5 in the shadow, and for = 0; 2; W C = W C = (1=2)W S . We remark that for the weight enumerator (3) the decomposition is given in [1] . Now we give some restriction on the possible weight enumerators of optimal singly even self-dual codes of lengths 58, 78 and singly even self-dual [98; 49; 18] codes. where ; are integers [1] . By Lemma 2, = 0; 1; 2. For these values of , singly even self-dual [58; 29; 10] codes with weight enumerators W C are known for many values of (see [6] ).
• The possible weight enumerators of optimal singly even self- 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the classical Shannon-theoretic approach to cryptology (see, e.g., [8] , [6] , [13] , and references therein), two assumptions are traditionally made. The first is that the reconstruction of the decrypted plaintext source at the legitimate receiver is distortion free (or almost distortion free), and the second, which is related, is that the encryption and the decryption units share identical copies of the same key. Yamamoto [15] has relaxed the first assumption and extended the theory of Shannon secrecy systems into a rate-distortion scenario, allowing lossy reconstruction at the legtimate receiver.
In this correspondence, we examine also the second assumption. Referring to Fig. 1 , we consider the case where the key is delivered to the legitimate receiver across a channel, which is cryptographically secure, but has limited capacity. For this setting, we characterize the achievable region in the space of three figures of merit: the security level (measured in terms of the equivocation), the compressibility of the cryptogram, and the distortion associated with the reconstruction of the plaintext source.
One conceptually simple approach to handle such a situation would be to apply a reliable channel code to the encryption key bits, at a rate Manuscript below the capacity of the channel, and thereby obtain, with high probability, the exact copy of the transmitted key bits at the receiver side. With this approach, however, the effective key rate, and hence the security level in terms of the equivocation, is limited by the channel capacity. The question that naturally arises at this point, especially in the lossy reconstruction scenario, is whether this is the best one can do.
To sharpen the question, let us even assume that there is an unlimited reservoir of random key bits at the transmitter side, denoted K K K = (K 1 ; K 2 ; . . .); K i 2 f0; 1g; i = 1; 2; . . .. Then, perhaps one might wish to use more the key rate (somewhat above capacity) for encryption and thereby increase the security of the cryptogram at the expense of some distortion at the reconstruction, due to the unavoidable mismatch between the encryption and decryption keys. To explore this point, let us consider a few speculative strategies.
In the first strategy, one sends the key bits K K K uncoded across the channel (assuming, for simplicity, that the channel has a binary input-output alphabet). Referring to Fig. 1 , let us take then N = n and X i = K i ; i = 1; 2; . . .. In this case, the noisy version of the key, obtained at the receiver side K 0 i = Yi is of course somewhat different from the original key. However, since only lossy reconstruction of the plaintext is required at the receiver side, it may seem conceivable that a reasonably small difference between the keys at both ends could be managable and thus cause a reasonably small distortion in the reconstruction. This is relatively easy to have if the encryption of the source precedes compression, as proposed in [3] : One may apply, for example, a certain memoryless mapping from the key bit stream into a stream of symbols Z1; Z2; . . . taking (two of the) values in the alphabet of plaintext source U. Then assuming that U is a commutative group endowed with an addition operation 8 (e.g., addition modulo the alphabet size), one can create the encrypted sequence U 0 i = Ui 8 Zi; i = 1; 2; . . . and then compress the block (U 0 1 ; . . . ; U 0 n ) with (K 0 1 ; . . . ; K 0 n ) as side information at the receiver, using a Slepian-Wolf encoder [9] in the lossless case, or a Wyner-Ziv code [11] in the lossy case. Assuming, for simplicity, lossless compression, then upon decompressing the source at the receiver side and obtaining (Ũ 1 ; . . . ;Ũ n ) (which is with high probability equal to (U 0 1 ; . . . ; U 0 n )), one "subtracts" the noisy version of the key and obtain (with high probability) the reconstruction V i = U 0 i 9 Z 0 i ; i = 1; 2; . . ., where Z 0 i is the corresponding noisy version of Zi. Now, since Vi 9 Ui = Zi 9 Z 0 i , for all i, then for a difference distortion measure d(U i ; V i ) = (V i 9 U i ), the distortion between Ui and its reconstruction Vi is identical to the distortion between the original key Z i and its noisy version Z 0 i . A somewhat more sophisticated version of this scheme generates Z1; Z2; . . . from the key bits using a simulator of a certain (memoryless) process (see, e.g., [10] and references therein), and then applies a good source-channel code to encode (Z 1 ; . . . ; Z n ) across the channel. The reconstructed version at the receiver side, Z 0 1 ; Z 0 2 ; . . ., would then have the minimum possible distortion relative to (Z 1 ; . . . ; Z n ), given by the distortion-rate function of fZ i g computed at the channel capacity, and therefore so would be also the distortion between fUig and fV i g. Moreover, there is an additional degree of freedom with regard 0018-9448/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
